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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
llO..:\UD OF EDUC.ATION OF
THE GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a Statutory corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent~

vs.

Case No.
10023

HEX H. COX and WILMINA
COX, his wife,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

ST . A.TEl\IENT OF THE NATURE OF
THE CASE
This originally was an action by which the plaintiff
sought to take appellant's property by way of an alleged contract, OR in the alternative, by way of condemnation proceedings. Said action having been filed
in two separate causes of action, respectively. This
court previously affirmed a Default Judgment against
the defendant, Rex H. Cox, (Case #9844) granted by
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the Honorable Merrill C. Faux. Whereupon, the
defendant, Rex H. Cox, sought an Order compelling
plaintiff to pay over to the defendant the amount of
the Judgment rendered in the above mentioned case,
and the lower court, Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson,
permitted new evidence to be admitted, enlarged upon
the scope of the Judgment in some respects, and cut
the Judgment in half. It is from this new Order that
the defendant, Rex H. Cox, is now again before this
court.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court granted a Default Judgment on
the first cause of action in the original case against both
defendants. Both defendants moved the lower court to
set aside said Default. The lower court, Honorable
Merrill C. Faux, set aside the Default Judgment as
to the Defendant "\Vilmina Cox, and denied same as to
the Defendant Rex H. Cox. The defendant, Rex H.
Cox, then appealed from the Order denying his motion
to set aside the Default Judgment, this court's case
#9844, and this court affirmed the lower court's decision. Defendant Wilmina Cox's case is still pending
in the lower court. The Defendant-Appellant, Rex H.
Cox, moved the lower court to have plaintiff pay over
to the defendant the amount of the Judgment rendered
by the lower court as set forth in the Default Judgment
and the lower court, Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson,
permitted new evidence to be admitted, enlarged, and
changed the scope of the case, and cut the Judgment
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in half and it is from this new Order that the Defendant.. \.ppellant appeals.

RELIEF SOUGI-IT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant, Rex H. Cox, seeks reversal
ot' the lower court's Order of October 23, 1963 modifying, enlarging the scope of, and diminishing the amount
of' the Judgment, of the lower court's Default J udgment heretofore rendered by the lower court on October
5, 19ti:!. Defendant, Rex H. Cox, further seeks enforcement of the J udg1nent granted on October 5, 1962
and the granting of his motion compelling the plaintiff
to pay over to the defendant, Rex H. Cox, the full
amount of the original Judgment.

STA_TEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff caused the defendants to be served
with a copy of its Summons and Complaint on or about
September 10, 1962. The plaintiff pleading its case in
two causes of action: one, requesting to take defendants' property by way of an alleged contract, and two,
by means of condemnation proceedings. The Salt Lake
County Clerk executed a default certificate on or about
October :2, 1962. Judge Merrill C. Faux granted default judgment against both defendants on or about
October 5, 1962 on plaintiff's first cause of action. The
defendants were served notice of said judgment on or
about November 9, 1962 and contacted counsel as soon

5
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after as an appointment could be made. Defendants'
counsel immediately contacted plaintiff's counsel. N e~
gotiations were pending for a period of approximately
ten days between respective counsel and their respective
clients without success. Defendants filed a Motion to
Set Aside the Judgment as well as a 1\'Iotion and Order
to Stay Proceedings and Stay Eexcution of Judgment
with the lower court and plaintiff's counsel, on or about
November 28, 1962, pursuant to the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure as follows:
1. Due to mistake, inadvertence, and excusable

neglect.
2. That the judgment was based upon a void con~

tract for the reason that the san1e did not comply
with the Statute of Frauds.
3. That the purported contract, the subject of said

judgment, is void or voidable for failure of
sideration.

con~

4. That the judgment is inequitable.

The proceedings and execution of judgment being
stayed as of that date until further order of the court.
Defendants' motion was called up for hearing be~
fore the Honorable 1.\'Ierrill C. Faux on December 4,
1962, all parties being present and being represented
by counsel. At this time testimony was adduced by both
sides and the lower court took the matter under advisement and to see if the parties could not resolve their
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diJl'ert·m'l's. The ruotion was further argued to the lower
court by respective counsel and submitted for decision.
The lower court granted the motion to set aside
the judgtnent as to Wilmina Cox but denied same as
to Hex II. Cox. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and u11 Order were filed and both plaintiff and defendant Hex H. Cox filed respective motions to have the
lowt:r court reconsider its Order and the court denied
san1e.
Au appeal \vas then taken to this court on behalf
of this defendant, Case #9844, and Defendant Wilmina
Cox filed her Answer to plaintiff's Complaint and
same is still pending trial in the lower court. This court
affirmed the Default Judgment against the defendant,
Hex H. Cox, in Case #9844. This defendant, Rex H.
Cox, upon remittitur of the record in said Case #9844,
demanded of the plaintiff the amount of the Judgment
heretofore granted. Plaintiff neglected, failed and/ or
refused to comply with the terms of said previous Default Judgment. The plaintiff then withdrew its warrant for $4!1,831.60 on file with the lower court, pursuant
to an Order of the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow,
such withdrawal being without notice to or the knowledge and/or consent of this defendant. (R. 70).
Plaintiff moved the lower court for an Order conYeying to the plaintiff an undivided one-half interest
in the property described in the Complaint in the original action to include any interest defendant, Rex H.
Cox, may have in the property described by metes and

7
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bounds and/or as described conforming to fence lines,
offering to tender its warrant in one-half of the sum
of the original Judgment in full payment of an alleged
undivided one-half interest in the defendant, Rex I-I.
Cox, in and to the property described in said complaint.
Plaintiff further sought to reform the legal description
by said motion (R. 71-2).
Plaintiff by this motion (R. 70-71 seeks to reduce
the amount of the Judgment (R. 8-9) and its Notice
of Judgment (R. 11) and to alter and enlarge the
description as set out in its Complaint (R. 1-4) and
its Judgment (R. 8-9) and to create a different ownership than as alleged in its Complaint and Judgment.
Defendant, Rex H. Cox, n1oved the lower court
for an Order compelling the plaintiff to pay over to
the defendant-appellant the full amount of the Judgment ( R. 8-9 and 73-7 4) .
At the time the respective above mentioned motions
were argued on October 17, 1963, the lower court permitted by its Order the previous Judgment to be altered
in the following respects, namely:
(a) Permitted new evidence to be admitted, over
the objections of this defendant. (Exhibit
P-1).
(b) Created a joint tenancy in the property in
question when, in fact, the record is completely
void of any evidence of such.
(c) Created an undivided one-half interest in and

8
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the property in question on behalf of Rex
H. Cox.
to

(d) Created an undivided one-half interest in defendant Wilmina Cox even though she was
not a party to said Motion nor a party of this
Appeal or the previous Appeal.

(e) Reduced the amount of the Judgment by onehalf.
(f) Denied defendant's Inotion to enforce the previous Judgment on behalf of the defendant,
Rex H. Cox.
(g) Conveyed an undivided one-half interest in
and to the property in question rather than
only the equity of this defendant, Rex H.
Cox.
The above Order was entered as of the 23rd day
of October, 1963 over the strenuous objection of this
defendant and it is from this Order opening up, ,admitting evidence and an1ending the Judgment of the
previous case that this defendant appeals to this court.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OPENIXG CP, AD~IITTING NEW EVIDENCE,
AXD r\.:\IENDING THE JUDGMENT PREYIO.USL1~ ~lADE BY THE LOWER COURT
AXD AFFIR~IED BY THE UTAH SUPREJ.VIE
COURT.

9
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The Plaintiff-Respondent by its Motion (R. 7172) attempted to enlarge the description in its complaint ( R. 1-4) and in its Judgment ( R. 8-9) , to
create an undivided one-half interest in both defendants ,
(even though the defendant 'Vilmina Cox was not a
party to said Motion or previous Appeal), requested
a conveyance of an undivided one-half interest in an
enlarged description, (even though the record is void
of any mention of how the property was held) , and
to reduce the Judgment by one-half. The lower court
permitted all of this in its Order of October 23, 1963
with the exception of the enlargement of the description.
In order to properly review the matter now before
this Court, we must look at the status of the October 5,
1962 Judgment as it was prior to the Order amending
same entered October 23, 1963. The plaintiff obtained
a Default Judgment from the lower court, Judge Merrill C. Faux presiding, on October 5, 1962 on its first
cause of action, i.e., on an alleged contract. Both defendants moved to have the Default set aside. The
lower court set aside same as to the defendant Wilmina
Cox and refused to vacate the Default Judgment as
to this appealing defendant, Rex H. Cox. The Utah
Supreme Court, on appeal by Rex H. Cox from the
Order refusing to set the Default aside as to him, affirmed the Judgment as to him, and the record was
returned to the lower court.
This Court must keep in mind that the Judgment
rendered on October 5, 1962, was solely of the making
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ot' the plaintiff and not of the defendant and even
though Lhis defendant does not necessarily agree with
it, he is bound by it as the Supreme Court on the preYious appeal (Case #9844) affirmed same.
\Ve also invite the court's attention to the fact that
at no time did the plaintiff object to the Judgment
either at the time it was taken by the plaintiff on
October 5, 1962, nor at the time the lower court made
its Order on January 9, 1963, nor at the time the
Supreme Court affirmed said Judgment against this
defendant, nor did the plaintiff cross appeal at the
tin1e this defendant appealed in case #9844. The first
attack which the plaintiff has made on said Judgment
was on October 10, 1963. Even the lower court in making its Order dated January 9, 1963, stated, "It is
difficult to see where the end result of my ruling will
be." (R. 54).
Rule 59 (e) U.R.C.P. states that a motion to alter
or amend the Judgment shall be served not later than
ten days after entry of the Judgment. Under said rule
the plaintiff has not made a timely motion to amend
or modify the Judgment. In fact, the plaintiff has waited
until an Appeal has been made by the defendant, Rex
H. Cox, a decision by the Supreme Court affirming the
Judgment, and after the case has been remitted to the
lower court for enforcement.
A Judgment or Decree should be in plain and intelligible language, and the property which is the subject
of Judgment should be described with sufficient cer-

11
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tainty to leave its identity free from doubt. Smith v.
Phillips~ 6 U. 378, 23 P. 932; City of Springville v.
Holley~ 6 U. 378, 23 P. 933. Judgments should be
read, construed, and applied as other writings are, and
if in light of pleadings and whole record they are certain, they should be enforced. Snow v. West~ 37 U.
528, 110 P. 52. The Judgment must be in conformity
with the pleadings and proof. Miller v. Johnson~ 43 U.
468, 134 P. 1017, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 294. Certainly in
the instant case, the Judgment is in conformity with
the pleadings and there is no ambiguity as to the nature
of same, nothing is left for conjecture in connection
with the Judgment and the Judgment conforms to our
rules, is valid, and should be enforced as originally
granted.
Under Rule 58A U.R.C.P. a Judgment is complete and is deemed entered for all purposes when it
is signed and filed, and not when notice is received by
the parties. In Re Bundy~s Estate~ 121 U. 299, 241
P .2d 462. The Judgment in question was entered on
October 5, 1962, was stayed until the appeal was affirmed, and remitted, and then became operative again.
The plaintiff cannot attempt to have the Judgment
altered or amended under our Rule 60 (b) inasmuch
as there has been no mistake, inadvertence, excusable
neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or etc., as
this Judgment is of the plaintiff's own making. The
plaintiff cannot avail itself of Rule 59 (a) U.R.C.P.
as none of the grounds apply. Neither can the plaintiff
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attempt to cmne under

Rule 60 (a) U.R.C.P. and
allege that a clerical 1nistake has been made inasmuch
as the .Judgment conforms to the pleadings and a nunc
pro tunc order cannot properly be used to revive the time
t'or taking a required step in a legal proceeding after
the statutory time for doing so had elapsed. Kettner
t'. Snow, 13 U. (2d) 382, 375 P.2d 28.
It is difficult to ascertain whether or not the plaintiff by its l\Iotion filed in the lower court on October
10, 1963, is attempting to attack the previously rendered
valid Judgment, which was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court (Case #9844), "directly" or "collaterally."
Courts have announced various rules, tests, and gauges
in determining whether a particular attack on a J udgment is "direct" or "collateral" and a splendid summary
of these Yarious rules is outlined in the case of I ntermill
t' . ..Yash, 94 U. 271, 75 P.2d 161. Without citing all of
the references, we would like to set forth some of the
tests shown in the above cited case, namely:
(I) "If the course taken to attack the decree is

one provided by law, that is, follows a
method prescribed by law to annul or void
the decree, the attack is said to be direct;
otherwise, it is said to be collateral."
(2) "If the proceeding is for the purpose of
setting aside or modifying the Judgment,
the attack is said to be direct ; if the aim of
the action is other relief than the vacating
of the judgment, the attack is said to be
collateral.''
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( 3) "If the voidness or invalidity of the judg-

ment appears from the record thereof, the
attack may be made collaterally, if based
upon matters dehors the record, it must be
made directly."

( 4) "Remedies pursued in the proceedings
wherein the judgment is rendered are direct
attacks; otherwise, they are looked upon as
collateral."
( 5) "Allegations in the pleadings may be ex-

amined to determine the nature and purpose
of the attack."

( 6) "The parties to the proceeding may be important, because in direct attack, the parties
to the judgment who would be affected
thereby must be made parties, as their rights
under the judgment are directly involved."
(7) "An action in equity, brought to annul the

judgment or set aside or vacate the same,
alleging proper equitable grounds therefor,
whether by plaintiff in his complaint, or by
cross-complaint or counterclaim by defendant in a proper proceeding, is a direct attack
on the judgment."
The above cited case further differentiates between
"direct" attack and "collateral" attack as follows:
"From an examination of the cases, there appears some confusion in the use of the terms
"direct attack" and "collateral attack" due to
the use of the same terms in different contexts.
To differentiate clearlv, one must have in mind,
not the terms used, but the reason underlying
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the differentiation. The terms "direct" and "collateral," as used in reference to attacks on judgments, apply to the purpose of, or the m~t~od
employed in, the attack, and not as descriptive
of the assault itself. The term "direct attack"
means a proceeding brought, instituted, or maintained directly for the purpose, that is, with the
direct and primary objective of modifying, setting aside, canceling or vacating, or enjoining
the enforcement of the judgment. The term
"collateral attack" means the questioning of the
validity of a judgment in a collateral proceeding; that is, a proceeding other than the one in
which the judgment is entered, and which is not
brought, instituted or maintained for the express purpose of modifying, setting aside, canceling, or enjoining the execution of the judgment. It is a denial of, or questioning the validity
of, a judgment, when the judgment is or becomes involved in the cause, only incidentally
and collaterally, and its enforcement or validity
is not the primary issue in or purpose of the proceeding."
In attempting to apply the plaintiff's motion under date
of October 10, 1963, seeking to amend the Judgment of
October 5, 1962, and the Court's Order amending said
Judgment under date of October 23, 1963, it might be
said that plaintiff's motion falls within the provision of
some of the above seven cited gauges inasmuch as it is attempting to modify the Judgment. Therefore, the attack would appear to be direct, also, the paintiff's motion
is based upon matters dehors the record which under
the above gauges would place his motion as a direct
attack upon the Judgment. Yet, on the other hand,

15
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the Judgment is being cut in half and is, therefore, seeking relief other than what the terms of the Judgment
are, therefore, the attack may be said to be collateral.
It appears from reviewing this motion that the
plaintiff is attempting to annul or void the decree in
some respects and to enlarge it in other respects therefore trying both a "direct" and a "collateral" attack
simultaneously and according to our statutes, rules,
and the general law both attempts must fail.
The general rule of law is that an application to
amend a Judgment must be made within the time
prescribed by statute. Furthermore, laches may defeat
the application. Laches or undue delay in making application for the amendment of a judgment alone is
grounds for denial of the application, particularly
where rights have vested under the judgment as entered
which would be disturbed by its alteration, as is the
case here. 49 C.J.S. paragraph 252. In the case at bar,
as previously stated, the plaintiff has not complained
of said Judgment until its October 10, 1963 motion
which is in excess of one year after the original J udgment was rendered and after the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed same. The general rule of law cited in 49
C.J.S. Paragraph 401 states that a Judgment which
is not void is not subject to collateral attack. Furthermore, a Judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject rna tter, unless
reversed or annulled in some proper proceeding, is not
open to contradiction or impeachment, in respect of its
validity, verity, or binding effect, by parties or privies,
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in any collateral action or proceeding. The Judgment
in the instant case meets the tests set forth in this rule.
The Judgment in the instant case also is res judicata and the general rule of res judicata is as set forth
in 50 C.J.S. Paragraph 592 as follows:
"Res judicata is a rule of universal law prevading every well regula ted system of j urisprudence, and is put on two grounds, embodied in
various maxims of the common law; the one,
public policy and necessity, which makes it to
the interest of the state that there should be an
end to litigation-interest republicae ut sit finis
litium; the other, the hardship on the individual
that he should be vexed twice for the same cause
-nemo debet his ve:x:ari pro eadem causa. The
doctrine applies and treats the final determination of the action as speaking the infallible truth
as to the rights of the parties as to the entire
subject of the controversy, and such controversy
and every part of it must stand irrevocably closed
by such determination. The sum and substance
of the whole doctrine is that a matter once judicially decided is finally decided."
The plaintiff in this case has by technicalities of time
and rules prevented, successfully, the defendant, Rex
H. Cox, from filing an answer, having a hearing on
the merits of the case and his day in court. Now the
plaintiff wants the privilege of entering new evidence,
wants to change and modify the decree, and wants to
change the status and rights of the other defendant
in an untimely motion and without joining the other
defendant in said motion. To permit the plaintiff to

17
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proceed on its own Default Judgment and then after
the Supreme Court has affirmed said Judgment, decide
that it does not like it and wants it changed would b~
highly irregular and inequitable to say the least, and
would, in effect, give no meaning to any type of J udgment or Order. The plaintiff is estopped and precluded
from relitigating the issues on the same cause of action.
The general rule is that, where the requirements
for res judicata are present, as in the instant case, a
decree in equity will bar a subsequent action at law
and a Judgment in an action at law will bar further
action in an equity proceeding. Therefore, the plaintiff
should be barred from amending the previous judgment
whether "directly" or "collaterally." 50 C.J.S. Paragraph 609.

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in opening up, admitting new
evidence and amending the judgment previously made
by the trial court which had been affirmed by the Utah
Supreme Court. The trial court had jurisdiction of the
parties and the subject matter and the Judgment was
not reversed or annulled but affirmed. Therefore, same
is not subject to "direct" or "collateral" attack and the
Judgment is res judicata. The Order entered under
date of October 23, 1963, by the trial court should be
set aside, the case remanded to the District Court, and
the Judgment of October 5, 1962, enforced, and the
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pluintitl' compelled to comply with said Judgment of
OctoLl'r 5, 1UH:! by granting of the motion of the defendant, Rex H. Cox, filed with the trial court on
October 11, 1963.
Respectfully submitted,

DAHL AND SAGERS
17 East Center Street
Midvale, Utah
Everett E. Dahl
Victor G. Sagers
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant
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